I. INTRODUCTION
This paper has two objectives. First it is an exploration of the way in which oligopolies behave over the business cycle. Second, it considers the possibility that this behaviour itself is a cause of business cycles and of sticky prices. We examine implicitly colluding oligopolies that attempt to sustain above competitive profits by the threat of reverting to competitive behavior to punish firms that do not cooperate.
The basic point of the paper is that the oligopolists find implicit collusion of this kind more difficult when their demand is high.
In other words when an industry faces a boom in its demand, chiseling (Bresnahan (1981 ) ) and the railroad industry (Porter (l985a) In order to achieve this the equilibrium strategies must involve a mechanism that deters an individual firm from "cheating" (by expanding output or by shading prices).
One such mechanism and one that has been fruitfullly employed in theoretical models^, is the use of punishments against the defecting firm in periods following the defection. If such punishments are large enough to outweigh the gain from a single period defection the collusive outcome is sustainable.
In order for the equilibrium strategies to be sequentially rational^, however, it must be the case that if a defection actually occurs the nondefecting firms are willing to mete out the proposed punishment. One way to ensure this is for firms that defect from the punishment to he punished in turn, and so on.
Rules which lead to optimal outcomes for the firms are provided by Abreu(l982) . A simpler way to ensure sequential rationality and the one usually employed (see Green and Porter (1984) , for example) is for punishments to involve playing the equilibrium strategies from the one-period game for some fixed period of time.
In the sequel we restrict attention to strategies of this kind. As we will see shortly, in addition to their simplicity and conformity with the literature they are also optimal punishments when price is the strategic Suppose that the level of firm profits that can be sustained in a period
with state e, is ir(e, , K(e,)) when the punishment is K(e ). Then using infinite length punishments, the discounted future value of profits, and hence the punishment, is .-^^'^^^T^J l^it, K(e'))dF(s').
(1)
Since the right hand side of (l) is independent of e, , the punishment is independent of the state and can be written merely as K. 
where a is 6/(l-6). ' We need to show there exists an el (_e, e) such that g( e!) = 0.
Equations (2) Therefore, using (4) and (5) lim
At the other extreme, . When deviating firms meet all of demand the analysis is more difficult. For this case we consider an example in which demand and marginal costs are linear:
Then monopoly output and price are:^,.' .
m If deviating firms could sell all they wanted at a price a shade below P they would equate (c+dq) to P . This would lead to output equal to q... : Marginal cost must not rise too rapidly and N must not be too big.
When the deviating firm meets demand its profits n are:
The change in n from a change in e, is simply q . Therefore using (.8j the change in the benefits from deviating is: 
The derivative of n at the optimum with respect to e, is q.
Therefore, using (8), the derivative of the benefit from deviating from the collusive output in any one period is: We also study some independent evidence on margins. Burda (1984) reports correlations between employment and real product wages in various two digit industries. Kreps and Wilson (l982) . For the game of complete information that we analyse we use Selten's concept of subgame perfection (1965) .
'*In an informal discussion, FCurz (l979) recognizes the link between short-run profitability and the sustainability of collusive outcomes. However, the relationship between profits, demand, and costs is not make explicit.
The argument of K, c*, in (3) should not be confused with that in (l). The latter represents the realization of the shock at t whereas the former is the state beyond which monopoly becomes unsustainable.
In this case an increase in e^can directly be interpreted as either a shift outwards in demand or a reduction in c, that part of marginal cost which is independent of q.
This results from the fact that the profit functions depend on e^only through (a+e-(--c) .
'^The relevant root is the one with the highest profits for the oligopoly.
The intersectoral pattern of output movements can be independent of the sector which has a technological shock if (as seems unlikely) goods are consumed in fixed proportions which depend on the level of utility only. Otherwise "normal" substitution effects will make the expansion biggest in the sector which has the most favorable technological shock. %hen constructing these aggregate concentration indices we systematically neglected the 4 digit SIC code industries which ended in 99.
These contain miscellaneous or "not classified elsewhere" items whose concentration index does not measure market power in a relatiely homogeneous market. 
